Moral Hazard and Limited Liability: Implications for the Theory of the Firm

James A. Brander · Barbara J. Spencer

64 citations0/0 files storedInternational Economic Review

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Abstract

This paper presents a theory of the firm based on moral hazard in the provision of effort by an owner-manager who borrows money in financial markets under conditions of limited liability. The authors examine the relationship between the financial structure of the firm and the effort and output decisions of the owner-manager. Results are reported concerning the determination of the firm's optimal financial structure, and concerning the positive and normative implications of financial structure for pure competition and monopoly. They also identify a strategic advantage from equity finance under Cournot oligopoly. Copyright 1989 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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References

1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 1958The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment 1977Determinants of corporate borrowing 1977The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach 1977INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 1984The effect of capital structure on a firm's liquidation decision 1989Oligopoly and financial structure: the limited liability effect 1935Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly

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