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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy
11 references·16 citing·34 second hop
An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy (2010)An Objective Justification of Bayesianism…The Logic of Scientific Discovery (2013)The Logic of Scientific Disco…Logic of Scientific Discovery, The (2010)Logic of Scientific Discovery…An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy (2010)An Objective Justification of…Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief (2008)Accuracy and Coherence: Prosp…Oxford Studies In Epistemology (2007)Oxford Studies In EpistemologyJustifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility (2006)Justifying Conditionalization…Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (1999)Papers in Metaphysics and Epi…A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism (1998)A Nonpragmatic Vindication of…Laws and Symmetry (1989)Laws and SymmetryLaws and symmetry (1989)Laws and symmetryChange in View: Principles of Reasoning. (1987)Change in View: Principles of…Knowing Science (2022)Knowing ScienceWhy Ideal Epistemology? (2021)Why Ideal Epistemology?The Bi-directional Relationship between Source Characteristics and Message Content (2018)The Bi-directional Relationsh…An Accuracy‐Dominance Argument for Conditionalization (2018)An Accuracy‐Dominance Argumen…Rationality as the Capacity for Understanding (2017)Rationality as the Capacity f…Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy (2017)Lockeans Maximize Expected Ac…Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief (2017)Epistemic Utility Theory and …Inference to the Best Explanation versus Bayes’s Rule in a Social Setting (2015)Inference to the Best Explana…Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities* (2015)Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learn…A normative framework for argument quality: argumentation schemes with a Bayesian foundation (2015)A normative framework for arg…What Does It Mean to be Biased (2014)What Does It Mean to be BiasedThe Evolution of Bayesian Updating (2013)The Evolution of Bayesian Upd…Rational Probabilistic Incoherence (2013)Rational Probabilistic Incohe…Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization—and Conglomerability and Reflection (2013)Expected Accuracy Supports Co…Epistemic Decision Theory (2013)Epistemic Decision TheoryProbability out of Determinism (2011)Probability out of DeterminismProbability and Evidence. (1973)Betting on Theories (1993)Uniqueness and Metaepistemology (2016)The Humean Theory of Motivation (1987)The Possibility of Practical Reason (1996)Putting Logic in its Place (2004)BELIEF IS CREDENCE ONE (IN CONTEXT) (2013)Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (2016)A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance (1980)Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach (1990)An Epistemic Nonconsequentialism (2020)The Scientific Image (1980)How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983)The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1984)Four-Dimensionalism (2001)Making Things Happen (2004)On the event relativity of modal auxiliaries (2010)Justification and the Truth-Connection (2012)Belief, credence, and norms (2013)Grounded theory research: Procedures, canons, and evaluative criteria (1990)Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm Whose Time Has Come (2004)Seeking Qualitative Rigor in Inductive Research (2012)Humean Supervenience debugged (1999)How Models Are Used to Represent Reality (2004)Truth and Truthmakers (2004)Answering Autobiographical Questions: The Impact of Memory and Inference on Surveys (1987)Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises (1998)Context and Content (1999)Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists (1983)Toward a new economics of science (1994)Aleatory or epistemic? Does it matter? (2008)Objects and Persons (2001)The Things We Mean (2003)The Nature of Normativity (2007)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 2013The Logic of Scientific Discovery7,732 cited
  • 1989Laws and Symmetry1,821 cited
  • 2010Logic of Scientific Discovery, The1,545 cited
  • 1989Laws and symmetry1,274 cited
  • 1987Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.1,245 cited
  • 1998A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism774 cited
  • 1999Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology680 cited
  • 2007Oxford Studies In Epistemology602 cited
  • 2006Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility385 cited
  • 2008Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief332 cited
  • 2010An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy247 cited

Cited by

  • 2015Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities*180 cited
  • 2013Epistemic Decision Theory159 cited
  • 2017Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy144 cited
  • 2014What Does It Mean to be Biased133 cited
  • 2013Rational Probabilistic Incoherence112 cited

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  • 2017Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief95 cited
  • 2013Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization—and Conglomerability and Reflection92 cited
  • 2021Why Ideal Epistemology?91 cited
  • 2015Inference to the Best Explanation versus Bayes’s Rule in a Social Setting88 cited
  • 2017Rationality as the Capacity for Understanding81 cited
  • 2018An Accuracy‐Dominance Argument for Conditionalization78 cited
  • 2011Probability out of Determinism65 cited
  • 2015A normative framework for argument quality: argumentation schemes with a Bayesian foundation62 cited
  • 2022Knowing Science60 cited
  • 2018The Bi-directional Relationship between Source Characteristics and Message Content54 cited
  • 2013The Evolution of Bayesian Updating53 cited