Is Vertical Co-Ordination an Effective Response to Economic and Technological Ties in Industrial Purchasing Relationships?

Abstract

Vertical co-ordination of business-to-business relationships figures prominently as an effective response to inter-firm dependence. Current empirical works based on transaction costs economics, however, have scantily examined whether the alignment of inter-firm coordination really serves governance efficacy and lowers transaction costs. This study focuses on the transaction costs efficacy of vertical co-ordination in industrial purchasing relationships. Building on transaction costs arguments and related works within marketing and contingency theory, the author explores whether vertical co-ordination is an effective means to adapt to technologcal and economic inter-firm ties. This research examines in particular possible impacts the buyer's manufacturing technology and deployment of specific assets on the governance efficacy of vertical co-ordination. Empirical findings from a survey of 171 industrial buying firms demonstrate that when asset specificity is substantial, increased vertical co-ordination reduces ex post transaction costs. Further, the governance efficacy of inter-firm co-ordination turned out to be more evident in purchasing relationships among buyers with flexible manufacturing technology (e.g., order based industries) than was the case in process production with high workflow rigidity.

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