this work references cited by second hopReferences
- 1980Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm10,540 cited
- 1996Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization9,565 cited
- 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
- 1988Herd Behavior and Investment2,815 cited
- 1989Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior2,585 cited
- 1991Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence1,876 cited
- 1988Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory1,719 cited
- 1987The theory of contracts1,330 cited
- 1983Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition1,111 cited
- 1983Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition975 cited
- 1988The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts682 cited
- 1986Managerial Incentives and Capital Management671 cited
- 1984Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents506 cited
- 1986A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation465 cited
- 1980Organization Capital452 cited
- 1971Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations
Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work