Common Knowledge of an Aggregate of Expectations

Lars Tyge Nielsen · Adam M. Brandenburger · John D Geanakoplos · Richard D. McKelvey · Talbot Page

59 citations0/0 files storedEconometrica

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Economic theories and models

Abstract

We provide a theorem giving a set of conditions under which public observation of an aggregate of individual expectations leads to consensus. The key concept unkerlying the result is that of common knowledge, as formalized by Aumann (1976)

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1976Agreeing to Disagree 1982We can't disagree forever 1983Don't Bet on It: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information 1987Common knowledge with probability 1 1984Common knowledge, communication, and convergence of beliefs

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2007Computational Aspects of Prediction Markets 1994Chapter 40 Common knowledge 1996Protocols Forcing Consensus 2010Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets with Strategic Traders 1992Characterizing stochastically monotone functions by multiattribute utility theory

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