References

• 1996Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization9,565 cited
• 1986The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration9,369 cited
• 1990Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm5,407 cited
• 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
• 1981The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance3,652 cited
• 2002Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm1,739 cited
• 2000The Ownership of Enterprise1,427 cited
• 1990Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring1,207 cited
• 2003Relational Incentive Contracts1,103 cited
• 1994Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts955 cited
• 1993Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts921 cited
• 1985The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems870 cited
• 1989Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment768 cited
• 1994The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information768 cited
• 1987The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts656 cited
• 1987On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting