The 'Truth' about Autopoiesis

Abstract

Like the economy and the royal family, autopoiesis has been receiving some bad publicity recently in Britain. What are we to make of a theory which apparently sees the legal system as firmly closed to all external influences' and which refuses even to accept the obvious fact that 'people make decisions'2? Surely our sympathies must lie with the critic who dismisses this unpronounceable theory as a lawyers' attempt 'to aggrandize the legal discourse by writing of law in half-apologetic and half-admiring tones'3? Or is what we have here not so much a social theory but a recognition of law's 'need to defend and perpetuate its traditional hegemony by defining itself as closed'4 a new and virulent form of legal positivism perhaps? Let me from the start declare an interest. Having myself presented an account of one version of the theory and applied its principles to decisions concerning children's welfare,5 I am anxious to scotch some of the rumours and distortions surrounding autopoiesis before they take on the status of unassailable myths. Furthermore, there is a risk that some of the misapprehensions that have been flying around are likely to deter students from taking the effort required to give the theory any serious attention. This, I believe, would be a pity, as, in spite of its controversial nature, autopoiesis does offer new and valuable insights into the operation of the legal system and its relationships with other social systems.

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