Slavery, Incentives, and Manumission: A Theoretical Model

Ronald E. Findlay

110 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Political Economy

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Colonialism, slavery, and trade Historical Economic and Social Studies Economic Theory and Institutions

Abstract

This paper presents a theoretical model of slavery and manumission in which the effective labor provided by slaves is a function of both the level of supervision costs incurred by the owner and the incentive payments received by the slaves. The optimal combination of supervision costs and incentive payments is determined together with the input of physical capital. The length of time it would take for a slave to purchase his freedom out of savings from his incentive payments is derived and is shown to vary inversely with the rate of interest.

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References

1937The Nature of the Firm 1996Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization 1958The Economics of Slavery in the Ante Bellum South 1964Between Slavery and Freedom 1956The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity 1970Industrial Slavery in the Old South

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2011The Economics of Labor Coercion 2005Slave prices, the African slave trade, and productivity in the Caribbean, 1674–1807 1 2012Slavery 2011Slavery and the Roman family 2009The Economics of Labor Coercion 2011Slavery Under the Principate 2012Money and finance 2011Slavery in the Roman Republic

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