What, and Where, Luck is: A Response to Jennifer Lackey

Neil L. Levy

44 citations0/0 files storedAustralasian Journal of Philosophy

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Free Will and Agency

Abstract

In ‘What Luck Is Not’, Lackey presents counterexamples to the two most prominent accounts of luck: the absence of control account and the modal account. I offer an account of luck that conjoins absence of control to a modal condition. I then show that Lackey's counterexamples mislocate the luck: the agents in her cases are lucky, but the luck precedes the event upon which Lackey focuses, and that event is itself only fortunate, not lucky. Finally I offer an account of fortune. Fortune is luck-involving, and therefore easily confused with luck, but it is not itself lucky.

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References

2005Epistemic Luck 2003Justice, luck, and knowledge 1995Luck: The Brilliant Randomness Of Everyday Life 2008What Luck is Not 2006Thinking about luck 2003Constitutive Luck

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2011Anti-luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment, and True Belief 2009Luck as an epistemic notion 2016The modal account of luck revisited

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