The Role of Reflection in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason

Houston Smit

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Kantian Philosophy and Modern Interpretations Philosophy and Theoretical Science Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Abstract

There are two prevailing interpretations of the status which Kant accorded his claims in the Critique of Pure Reason: 1) he is analyzing our concepts of cognition and experience; 2) he is making empirical claims about our cognitive faculties. I argue for a third alternative: on Kant’s account, all cognition consists in a reflective consciousness of our cognitive faculties, and in critique we analyze the content of this consciousness. Since Strawson raises a famous charge of incoherence against such a position, I begin by showing that this charge is misplaced.

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2020Transcendental Philosophy As Capacities‐First Philosophy 2007Hegel and the Transformation of Philosophical Critique 2014Does Kant Demand Explanations for All Synthetic A Priori Claims?2015Varieties of Reflection in Kant's Logic 2009Reflection, Enlightenment, and the Significance of Spontaneity in Kant 2018C. I. Lewis, Kant, and the reflective method of philosophy 2018Epistemic agency and the self-knowledge of reason: on the contemporary relevance of Kant’s method of faculty analysis 2018How to solve the knowability paradox with transcendental epistemology

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