Prediction and postdiction preferences in guessing

Abstract

Abstract In three studies, it is shown that most subjects when asked to guess the outcome of an uncertain event (a die toss, the sex of a child, the winner of a match) will prefer to do so before the event. This holds regardless of consequences of the guess, or of variations in waiting time from the guess being made to the outcome being known. In a chance situation, a guess‐first preference may be partly explained by a ‘magical control’ hypothesis, but the preference persists in situations where such influences are less thinkable (sex of a child, die thrown by another person). When asked how prediction and postdiction guesses differ, most subjects agree that predictions are most exciting, and that postdiction failures cause more discomfort than prediction failures. Such differences are interpreted as due to the relative amount of perceived internal and external uncertainty in the task at hand. It is speculated that internal uncertainty is felt most acceptable when matched by a corresponding external uncertainty, and most aversive when contrasted to an externally established fact.

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