Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS

Unknown author

1996-03-01articleThe Journal of Finance1,291 citationsclosed

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Corporate Finance and Governance Financial Markets and Investment Strategies Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

Abstract

ABSTRACT This study examines firm characteristics that lead to shareholder activism and analyzes the effects of activism on target firm governance structure, shareholder wealth, and operating performance for the 51 firms targeted by CalPERS over the 1987–93 period. Firm size and level of institutional holdings are found to be positively related to the probability of being targeted, and 72 percent of firms targeted after 1988 adopt proposed changes or make changes resulting in a settlement with CalPERS. Shareholder wealth increases for firms that adopt or settle and decreases for firms that resist. No statistically significant change in operating performance is found.

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