Simulation of Investment Decision-Making – Learning at Different Levels of Backward Information

Abstract

In this study is being considered the process of learning under laboratory conditions of decision-making. During the simulation of investment, a group of thirty examinees is choosing strategies from defined set trying to maximize their own effect in the course of discreetly arranged time period. Information about alternatives and backward information are limited; therefore there are two levels of limitations. The research is directed toward a scenario with richer information-content, and certain conclusions are also referred to the topic of “minimal feedback in game” which was treated in the previous research. Decision-making and learning during the game is analysed through indicators: attitude toward the risk, perception of successful and unsuccessful strategies, promptness in orientation reversing and consideration of missed opportunities. In this matter are being recognized the models of learning of a behavioural game theory, with limitations since in the scenario of investment there is no interactions. Efficiency results and present models of behaviour and learning at individuals and population of players undoubtedly indicate that backward information is very influential and significant.

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