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• 1999Testing static tradeoff against pecking order models of capital structure1This paper has benefited from comments by seminar participants at Boston College, Boston Unsiversity, Dartmouth College, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Massachusetts, Ohio State University, University of California at Los Angeles and the NBER, especially Eugene Fama and Robert Gertner. The usual disclaimers apply. Funding from MIT and the Tuck School at Dartmouth College is gratefuly acknowledged. We also thank two reviewers, Richard S. Ruback and Clifford W. Smith, Jr., for helpful comments.1