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How Preussag Became TUI: A Clinical Study of Institutional Blockholders and Restructuring in Europe
16 references·0 citing·34 second hop
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References

  • 1986Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers17,216 cited
  • 1980Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm10,540 cited
  • 1996Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers9,308 cited
  • 1993The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems8,544 cited
  • 1986Large Shareholders and Corporate Control8,403 cited
  • 2002The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations3,798 cited
  • 1986The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers3,764 cited
  • 2001From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization3,555 cited
  • 1994Politicians and Firms3,440 cited
  • 2004Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison2,512 cited
  • 2006Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings2,135 cited
  • 2002What Do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell Us? Evidence from Firms That Make Many Acquisitions1,743 cited
  • 2007Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US1,730 cited
  • 2002Ferreting out Tunneling: An Application to Indian Business Groups1,680 cited
  • 1998Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade‐Off between Liquidity and Control?1,453 cited

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  • 2002Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups1,171 cited
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