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Making rules credible: divided government and political budget cycles
16 references·0 citing·42 second hop
Making rules credible: divided government and political budget cycles (2012)Making rules credible: divided government…The Oxford handbook of political economy (2007)The Oxford handbook of politi…Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work (2003)Veto Players. How Political I…The Economic Effects of Constitutions (2003)The Economic Effects of Const…Veto Players (2002)Veto PlayersPolitical Cycles and the Macroeconomy (1997)Political Cycles and the Macr…Why Parties? (1995)Why Parties?A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context (1993)A Cross-National Analysis of …Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies (1989)Political and economic determ…Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles (1988)Elections and Macroeconomic P…Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles (1987)Equilibrium Political Budget …The Political Economy of Federalism (1985)The Political Economy of Fede…The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target (1985)The Optimal Degree of Commitm…Political Control of the Economy. (1979)Political Control of the Econ…On the Determination of the Public Debt (1979)On the Determination of the P…Political Control of the Economy (1978)Political Control of the Econ…Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans (1977)Rules Rather than Discretion:…A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures (1956)An Economic Theory of Democracy. (1958)Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe (2004)Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik (2006)Quiet Politics and Business Power (2010)Barro on the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem (1976)Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence (1978)Unanticipated Money, Output, and the Price Level in the United States (1978)Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital (1983)Equilibria under ‘active’ and ‘passive’ monetary and fiscal policies (1991)Growth in a Time of Debt (2010)The Political Business Cycle (1975)Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy (1983)Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence (1993)Voting for autocracy: hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico (2007)Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria (1987)Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition (1992)Peasants or Bankers? The American Electorate and the U.S. Economy (1992)Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule (1977)A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model (1981)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)International Norm Dynamics and Political Change (1998)The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective (1999)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements (1961)Capital Theory and Investment Behavior (1963)On Second-Best National Saving and Game-Equilibrium Growth (1968)Macroeconomics and Reality (1980)Discretion versus policy rules in practice (1993)INTEREST AND PRICES: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF MONETARY POLICY (2005)Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (1979)Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. By Morris P. Fiorina. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981. Pp. xii + 249. $35.00, cloth; $9.95, paper.) (1982)Democracy and growth (1996)Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes (2000)Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities (2000)The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda (2003)Cultural Backlash (2019)Do Institutions Cause Growth? (2004)The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins (2008)Democracy and dictatorship revisited (2009)Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II (2005)A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change (2009)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1977Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans7,938 cited
  • 1985The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target3,687 cited
  • 2002Veto Players3,530 cited
  • 2003Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work3,369 cited
  • 1979On the Determination of the Public Debt3,342 cited
  • 1995Why Parties?2,374 cited
  • 1993A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context2,159 cited
  • 1987Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles1,968 cited
  • 2003The Economic Effects of Constitutions1,710 cited
  • 1988Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles1,664 cited
  • 1997Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy1,520 cited
  • 1985The Political Economy of Federalism1,467 cited
  • 1989Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies1,373 cited
  • 2007The Oxford handbook of political economy1,352 cited
  • 1979Political Control of the Economy.1,306 cited
  • 1978Political Control of the Economy1,245 cited

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