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Stable matchings and preferences of couples
16 references·12 citing·28 second hop
Stable matchings and preferences of couples (2004)Stable matchings and preferences of coupl…The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics (2002)The Economist as Engineer: Ga…Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions (1994)Jumping the Gun: Imperfection…Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. (1992)Two Sided Matching: A Study i…A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom. (1991)A natural experiment in the o…Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching (1990)Random Paths to Stability in …NP-complete stable matching problems (1990)NP-complete stable matching p…On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets (1986)On the Allocation of Resident…The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem (1985)The college admissions proble…The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory (1984)The Evolution of the Labor Ma…The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives (1982)The Economics of Matching: St…Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes (1982)Job Matching, Coalition Forma…Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm (1981)Machiavelli and the Gale-Shap…Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets (1970)Stable marriage assignment fo…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic DesignThe Redesign of the Matching …Stable Matching in Large Economies (2019)Stable Matching in Large Econ…An invitation to market design (2017)An invitation to market designContract design and stability in many-to-many matching (2016)Contract design and stability…Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities (2014)Stability in Large Matching M…Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts (2012)Matching in Networks with Bil…Entrepreneurship and organization design (2012)Entrepreneurship and organiza…Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts (2009)Stable many-to-many matchings…Matching with Contracts: Comment (2008)Matching with Contracts: Comm…Paths to stability for matching markets with couples (2006)Paths to stability for matchi…Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness (2006)Many-to-One Stable Matching: …Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets (2006)Incomplete information and si…A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues (2006)A solution to matching with p…Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement (1999)Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match (2009)Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences (2012)Cores of convex games (1971)The assignment game I: The core (1971)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Pairwise kidney exchange (2005)The New York City High School Match (2005)The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (2011)Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions (2007)Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (2008)What Have We Learned from Market Design? (2008)A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks (1996)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Contrasting Computational Models of Mate Preference Integration Across 45 Countries (2019)Matching with Contracts (2005)Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action (1986)Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term (1995)Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria (1998)Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market (1993)The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework (1999)School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach (2003)Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets (2007)On cores and indivisibility (1974)The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures (2002)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage5,978 cited
  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage2,082 cited
  • 1992Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.1,625 cited
  • 1982Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes1,307 cited
  • 1984The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory1,217 cited
  • 2002The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics1,006 cited
  • 1982The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives897 cited
  • n.d.The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design757 cited
  • 1981Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm655 cited
  • 1985The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem467 cited
  • 1990Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching355 cited
  • 1986On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets348 cited
  • 1991A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom.342 cited
  • 1994Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions

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342 cited
  • 1970Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets226 cited
  • 1990NP-complete stable matching problems188 cited
  • Cited by

    • 2006A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues123 cited
    • 2008Matching with Contracts: Comment117 cited
    • 2012Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts104 cited
    • 2014Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities100 cited
    • 2016Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching97 cited
    • 2006Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness93 cited
    • 2009Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts93 cited
    • 2019Stable Matching in Large Economies75 cited
    • 2006Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets72 cited
    • 2006Paths to stability for matching markets with couples70 cited
    • 2017An invitation to market design70 cited
    • 2012Entrepreneurship and organization design10 cited