Pascal's Wager as an Argument for Not Believing in God

Michael Martin

34 citations0/0 files storedReligious Studies

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Study and Philosophy of Religion Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Theology and Philosophy of Evil

Abstract

Can Pascal's wager for the existence of God be turned against the religious believer and used as an argument for not believing in God? Although such an argument has been very briefly sketched by others its details have remained undeveloped. In this paper this argument is worked out in detail in the context of decision theory and is defended against objections. The result is a plausible argument for atheism.

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2015Games and Decisions 1966Aspects of Scientific Explanation.1965The Inference to the Best Explanation 1968God and Philosophy.1972The Logic of Pascal's Wager

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2007The Persecutor's Wager 2013Religion and Secular Utility: Happiness, Truth, and Pragmatic Arguments for Theistic Belief 2012The Many Gods Objection to Pascal’s Wager

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