Government Clubs: Theory and Evidence from Voluntary Environmental Programs

Abstract

This chapter analyzes the operation of green clubs by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), their management of tension, attracting of new members, as well as how they are able to uphold their standards. In contrast to nongovernmental green clubs, those run by the government offer not simply an enhance reputation, but also relief from regulatory requirements. The chapter digs more deeply into the EPA’s experience with one of its voluntary programs, Performance Track, at the same time placing twenty-eight under the club theory analytic lens. It then makes the conclusion that while these government-sponsored green clubs can provide firms with substantial benefits, there remains resistance due to political and legal constraints. This is the reason that government-sponsored voluntary environmental programs only offer limited membership slots.

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