Reasoned assumptions and Pareto optimality

Abstract

: Default and non-monotonic inference rules are not really epistemological statements, but are instead desires or preferences of the agent about the makeup of its own mental state (epistemic or otherwise) . The fundamental relation in non-monotonic logic is not so much self-knowledge as self-choice or self-determination, and the fundamental justification of the interpretations and structures involved come from decision theory and economics rather than from logic and epistemology. December 17, 1984 Revised January 29, 1985 c fl Copyright 1984, 1985 by Jon Doyle. For presentation at IJCAI-85. This paper is based on a talk presented at the CSLI Workshop on Planning and Practical Reasoning, Stanford University, June 1984. I thank Joseph Schatz for his advice and comments, and Monnett Hanvey and one of the IJCAI referees for discovering an error in an earlier draft. This research was supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DOD), ARPA Order No. 3597, monitored by the Air ...

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