HOW MANY FIRMS SHOULD BE LEADERS? BENEFICIAL CONCENTRATION REVISITED*

Hiroaki Ino · Toshihiro Matsumura

55 citations0/0 files storedInternational Economic Review

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Merger and Competition Analysis Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

This article investigates the relationship between the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and welfare in multiple‐leader Stackelberg models. We formulate two long‐run models of free entry of followers; in the first (second) model, leaders select their output before (after) the entry of the followers. We find that in both models, in contrast to the short‐run models, the Stackelberg model yields a larger welfare and HHI than the Cournot model does regardless of the number of leaders; that is, beneficial concentration always occurs.

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References

1965Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games 1986Free Entry and Social Inefficiency 1998Partial privatization in mixed duopoly 1987Entry Barriers and Economic Welfare 1988Helping Minor Firms Reduces Welfare 2005Mixed Oligopoly at Free Entry Markets 1984A Multiple Leader Stackelberg Model and Analysis 2001Stackelberg Beats Cournot: On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets*

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