Does Perceiving Entail Knowing?

John Turri

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and Theoretical Science Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

Abstract

Abstract This article accomplishes two closely connected things. First, it refutes an influential view about the relationship between perception and knowledge. In particular, it demonstrates that perceiving does not entail knowing. Second, it leverages that refutation to demonstrate that knowledge is not the most general factive propositional attitude.

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References

2000Knowledge and Its Limits 2002Knowledge and its Limits 1976Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge 1999From metaphysics to ethics: a defence of conceptual analysis 1949Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits 2010Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2007A Virtue Epistemology 1954Some Main Problems of Philosophy.

Cited by

2012Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge?2019Knowing by Perceiving 2016Vision, knowledge, and assertion 2023Awareness and the Substructure of Knowledge 2013Luck, propositional perception, and the Entailment Thesis 2017Reasons and factive emotions 2020An Open and Shut Case: Epistemic Closure in the Manifest Image 2020

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