GREENHOUSE‐GAS EMISSION CONTROLS IN AN OPEN ECONOMY*

Abstract

To examine how greenhouse‐gas emission controls affect a country's industrial and trade structures, this article presents an open economy model that has both Ricardian and Heckscher–Ohlin features. We specifically compare emission quotas, emission taxes, and emission standards. The patterns of production and trade critically hinge on those policy tools. It is shown that a domestic emission control may lead to carbon leakage and may not reduce the world emissions, and that emission standards may work as a “hidden” production subsidy toward an emission‐intensive industry.

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