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ArticleMoral hazard with bounded payments

Ian Jewitt2008

Article2008

Moral hazard with bounded payments

Ian Jewitt · Ohad Kadan · Jeroen M. Swinkels

129 citations·0/0 files stored·Journal of Economic Theory

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Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Applications Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

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References

1979Moral Hazard and Observability 1973The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.1983An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem 1992An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem 1990Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices 1976The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization 1985The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems 1999The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I

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Year2008

Typearticle

Published2008-05-29

VenueJournal of Economic Theory

ISSN-L0022-0531

Languageen

Citations129

Files0 public / 0

ShelfAuction Theory and Applications

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doi10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.004

openalex_workW2102894795

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