Coordination and cooperation in asymmetric commons dilemmas

Marco A. Janssen · John Martin Anderies · Sanket R. Joshi

96 citations0/0 files storedExperimental Economics

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Game Theory and Voting Systems Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Abstract

Abstract In this paper we discuss laboratory experiments that address the problem of self-governance in an asymmetric commons dilemma. Small-scale irrigation systems that provide food for hundreds of millions of people around the world are probably the most common example of such dilemmas. Here, we formulate an abstract dilemma in which subjects make both a decision about investment in the provision of infrastructure associated with the use of a resource and about how much to extract from the common-pool resource made available by this infrastructure. The impact of inherent asymmetry in irrigation systems on the provision of a resource and the impact of communication on the capacity of the group to solve the two-level commons dilemma of cooperation and coordination based on the analysis of the experimental data are discussed.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 96 citations exist upstream.

References

2002Altruistic punishment in humans 2000Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments 1995The Handbook of experimental economics 19952. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research 1992Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible 2003Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences 1986The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good.1958Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power

Cited by

2016Assessing Collective Measures in Rural Policy: The Effect of Minimum Participation Rules on the Distribution of Benefits from Irrigation Infrastructure 2011Head-enders as stationary bandits in asymmetric commons: Comparing irrigation experiments in the laboratory and the field 2013Environmental variability and collective action: Experimental insights from an irrigation game 2013A multi-method approach to study robustness of social–ecological systems: the case of small-scale irrigation systems 2014Allocating a voluntarily provided common-property resource: An experimental examination

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.