The Rationale of Variation in Methodological and Evidential Pluralism

Abstract

Causal analysis in the social sciences takes advantage of a variety of methods and of a multi-fold source of information and evidence.This pluralistic methodology and source of information raises the question of whether we should accordingly have a pluralistic metaphysics and epistemology.This paper focuses on epistemology and argues that a pluralistic methodology and evidence don't entail a pluralistic epistemology.It will be shown that causal models employ a single rationale of testing, based on the notion of variation.Further, I shall argue that this monistic epistemology is also involved in alternative philosophical theories of causation.

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