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In this paper, I will examine Hume's account of the causal relation between character and action in morality.*Hume maintains that the relation between character and action is contingent, but 1 intend to show that his discussion suggests that the relation is necessary.^And the necessity is not, as he believes, a psychological feature of spectator/ evaluators who would conclude, upon witnessing the performance of an action, that the agent of that action possesses a certain character trait. 1 References to Hume are to the following texts: -A Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd ed.L.A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford Univ.Press, 1978); abbreviated as T, with page numbers given in parenthesis.The following alternative abbreviation is also used: Till, meaning Treatise Book I, Part I, Section 1. -An Abstract to A Treatise of Human Nature, referred to simply as Abstract; in the Sclby-Bigge/Nidditch edition of the Treatise, with page numbers given in parenthesis.-Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 3rd.ed., L.A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford Univ.Press, 1975); abbreviated as E, followed by page numbers in parenthesis.^Similar conclusions as I will establish in this discussion have been arrived at, in a more general context, by Donald W. Livingston.See his "Hume on Ultimate Causation," (American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January, 19711), pp.63-70; and Hume's Philosophy of Common Life (The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984), chs.6 and 7.For discussions of other aspects of Hume's conception of character and action sec the following: Rachael Kydd, Reason and Conduct in Hume's Treatise (London: Oxford
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