Semantic Universals and Primitive Thought: The Question of the Psychic Unity of Humankind

Abstract

This article argues that the belief in the "psychic unity of humankind," which the author shares, can degenerate into an empty rhetorical posture if it is not linked with an empirical search for a shared conceptual basis linking different cultures and languages. The author argues that the reasoning of believers in "primitive thought" is fallacious, and she tries to show where exactly it goes wrong. In particular, she argues that the proponents of the primitive‐thought doctrine do not understand the phenomenon of polysemy and have no methodology that would allow them to establish whether a word has one or more meanings. More generally, she tries to show how the claims of the proponents of the primitive‐thought doctrine can be refuted on the basis of solid evidence, sound analysis, and rigorous methodology.

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