A Theory of Escalation And International Conflict

Abstract

Escalation processes are found in many types of international conflict. However, a great deal of the theoretical and empirical literature on escalation is context specific and concentrates on explaining the outcomes of an escalation process. This approach has generated numerous insights; however, our understanding of escalation processes, in general, remains partial and incomplete. In this article, the author develops a two-sided incomplete information model to identify the kinds of escalation strategies states are likely to adopt in conflict. The model produces several hypotheses, one of which is tested empirically in the context of militarized interstate disputes. The hypothesis states that as the disparity between the players' cost tolerances increases, the lower cost tolerant actor is more likely to escalate to the maximum of his or her ability on the first move in the conflict. The results of the test confirm the theory's expectations of an inverse relationship between cost tolerance and an actor's escalation behavior. The article concludes by noting implications for future research on escalation processes.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 85 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.