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Surprisingly Rational: Evidence that people follow probability theory when judging probabilities, and that biases in judgment are due to noise
9 references·0 citing·42 second hop
Surprisingly Rational: Evidence that people follow probability theory when judging probabilities, and that biases in judgment are due to noise (2012)Surprisingly Rational: Evidence that peop…Toward a synthesis of cognitive biases: How noisy information processing can bias human decision making. (2011)Toward a synthesis of cogniti…How probability theory explains the conjunction fallacy (2008)How probability theory explai…Fallacies in probability judgments for conjunctions and disjunctions of everyday events (2008)Fallacies in probability judg…Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate? (2000)Individual differences in rea…Support theory: A nonextensional representation of subjective probability. (1994)Support theory: A nonextensio…Simultaneous over- and underconfidence: The role of error in judgment processes. (1994)Simultaneous over- and underc…Conservatism in human information processing (1982)Conservatism in human informa…Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability (1973)Availability: A heuristic for…In defense of probabilistic functionalism: a reply. (1955)In defense of probabilistic f…Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1975)The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice (1981)Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk (1988)Bias in algorithmic filtering and personalization (2013)Guidance on Expert Knowledge Elicitation in Food and Feed Safety Risk Assessment (2014)Cognitive and Interpersonal Features of Intellectual Humility (2017)Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men (1950)Method and Theory in Experimental Psychology (1954)Representative design and probabilistic theory in a functional psychology. (1955)The Projective Perception of the Social World (2000)The relationship between performance in dynamic systems and intelligence (2004)Picking profitable investments: The success of equal weighting in simulated venture capitalist decision making (2015)Belief in the law of small numbers. (1971)Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness (1972)On the psychology of prediction. (1973)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1974)Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. (1977)Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk (1979)The theory of planned behavior (1991)A power primer. (1992)Handbook of Emotions (1993)On the Shape of the Probability Weighting Function (1999)Perspective Taking as Egocentric Anchoring and Adjustment. (2004)Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. (1983)On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky. (1996)On the reality of cognitive illusions. (1996)DECISION‐MAKING MODELS, DECISION SUPPORT, AND PROBLEM SOLVING (2021)Good Guesses (2021)A unified explanation of variability and bias in human probability judgments: How computational noise explains the mean–variance signature. (2023)Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics (2003)Linda is not a bearded lady: Configural weighting and adding as the cause of extension errors. (2009)The Double-Edged Sword of Decentralized Planning in Multiteam Systems (2012)Explaining High Conjunction Fallacy Rates: The Probability Theory Plus Noise Account (2016)Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control (1999)A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality. (2003)Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making (2005)Arbitrary metrics in psychology. (2006)Two-stage dynamic signal detection: A theory of choice, decision time, and confidence. (2010)Ubiquitous Log Odds: A Common Representation of Probability and Frequency Distortion in Perception, Action, and Cognition (2012)A model of investor sentiment /The Intuitive Psychologist And His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process (1977)A model of investor sentiment1We are grateful to the NSF for financial support, and to Oliver Blanchard, Alon Brav, John Campbell (a referee), John Cochrane, Edward Glaeser, J.B. Heaton, Danny Kahneman, David Laibson, Owen Lamont, Drazen Prelec, Jay Ritter (a referee), Ken Singleton, Dick Thaler, an anonymous referee, and the editor, Bill Schwert, for comments.1 (1998)
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References

  • 1973Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability9,980 cited
  • 2000Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?4,263 cited
  • 1994Support theory: A nonextensional representation of subjective probability.1,159 cited
  • 1982Conservatism in human information processing1,004 cited
  • 1994Simultaneous over- and underconfidence: The role of error in judgment processes.644 cited
  • 2011Toward a synthesis of cognitive biases: How noisy information processing can bias human decision making.391 cited
  • 1955In defense of probabilistic functionalism: a reply.77 cited
  • 2008How probability theory explains the conjunction fallacy73 cited
  • 2008Fallacies in probability judgments for conjunctions and disjunctions of everyday events20 cited

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