Revealed Conflicting Preferences

Abstract

We model a DM as a collection of utility functions (selves, rationales) and an aggregation rule (a theory of how selves are activated by choice sets). The DM’s choice function is rationalized by a collection of selves and an aggregator if it selects the unique maximizer of aggregate utility. For a general class of aggregators, we show that the number of selves required to rationalize a choice function is at most a linear function of the number of IIA violations exhibited. We provide simple conditions for checking when an aggregator can rationalize all choice functions with enough selves; and provide a minimal set of behaviors that an aggregator can rationalize with a fixed number of selves. We apply the framework to choice over menus and examine the revealed preference implications of IIA violations for the subjective state-space. While consistent with evidence in psychology on multiple selves, our framework also has implications for models of collective household behavior and marketing models of multiattribute goods.

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