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Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
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Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy Nash Equilibrium (2004)Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Str…Handbook of Computational Economics Vol. 3 (2014)Handbook of Computational Eco…Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation (2003)Incentive-compatible, budget-…Exploring bidding strategies for market-based scheduling (2003)Exploring bidding strategies …Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions (2003)Approximately-strategyproof a…Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions (2002)Truth revelation in approxima…The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics (2002)The Economist as Engineer: Ga…Analyzing Complex Strategic Interactions in Multi-Agent Systems (2002)Analyzing Complex Strategic I…High-performance bidding agents for the continuous double auction (2001)High-performance bidding agen…Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001)Algorithmic Mechanism DesignAchieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges (2001)Achieving Budget-Balance with…Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment (2000)Preventing Strategic Manipula…Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms (2000)Computationally feasible VCG …Price Formation in Double Auctions (1998)Price Formation in Double Auc…Handbook of Computational Economics (1996)Handbook of Computational Eco…COMPUTATION OF EQUILIBRIA IN FINITE GAMES (1996)COMPUTATION OF EQUILIBRIA IN …Chapter 2 Computation of equilibria in finite games (1996)Chapter 2 Computation of equi…Symmetric Decomposition of Asymmetric Games (2018)Symmetric Decomposition of As…Non-Cooperative Games (1951)Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria (1987)Nashification and the Coordination Ratio for a Selfish Routing Game (2003)A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues (2006)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)Incentives in Teams (1973)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria (2002)Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions (2004)Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions (2008)Optimal Auction Design (1981)A survey on networking games in telecommunications (2004)Worst-case equilibria (2009)An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior (1991)Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science (1991)Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality (1993)Strategic sequential bidding in auctions using dynamic programming (2002)Evolutionary mechanism design: a review (2009)Multipart pricing of public goods (1971)Combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation (2000)Auctions and bidding (2011)Auction Mechanisms Toward Efficient Resource Sharing for Cloudlets in Mobile Cloud Computing (2015)The decision and the organization (1965)Agent-human interactions in the continuous double auction (2001)Internet-Based Virtual Stock Markets for Business Forecasting (2003)College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)Pairwise kidney exchange (2005)The New York City High School Match (2005)The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (2011)Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games (1965)The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game (2002)Run the GAMUT: A Comprehensive Approach to Evaluating Game-Theoretic Algorithms (2004)Computational Methods for the Study of Dynamic Economies (2001)Estimating dynamic equilibrium economies: linear versus nonlinear likelihood (2005)Computable Markov-perfect industry dynamics (2010)Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities (2005)Approximate mechanism design without money (2009)
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References

  • 2001Algorithmic Mechanism Design1,331 cited
  • 2002The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics1,006 cited
  • 2002Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions658 cited
  • 1998Price Formation in Double Auctions370 cited
  • 2000Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms325 cited
  • 1996COMPUTATION OF EQUILIBRIA IN FINITE GAMES266 cited
  • 1996Handbook of Computational Economics253 cited
  • 2001Achieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges232 cited
  • 1996Chapter 2 Computation of equilibria in finite games160 cited
  • 2001High-performance bidding agents for the continuous double auction124 cited
  • 2003Exploring bidding strategies for market-based scheduling124 cited
  • 2002Analyzing Complex Strategic Interactions in Multi-Agent Systems120 cited
  • 2003Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation107 cited
  • 2003Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions99 cited
  • 2000Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment89 cited

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  • 2014Handbook of Computational Economics Vol. 386 cited
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    • 2018Symmetric Decomposition of Asymmetric Games39 cited