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Budget Feasible Mechanisms
4 references·13 citing·29 second hop
Budget Feasible Mechanisms (2010)Budget Feasible MechanismsTruthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions (2008)Truthful approximation mechan…Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001)Algorithmic Mechanism DesignOptimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignCOUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS,…Data pricing in machine learning pipelines (2022)Data pricing in machine learn…A two-stage incentive mechanism for rebalancing free-floating bike sharing systems: Considering user preference (2021)A two-stage incentive mechani…Spatial-Temporal Inventory Rebalancing for Bike Sharing Systems With Worker Recruitment (2020)Spatial-Temporal Inventory Re…A Truthful Budget Feasible Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Time Critical Tasks (2015)A Truthful Budget Feasible Mu…Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Competitive Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets (2014)Mechanism Design for Crowdsou…Deferred-acceptance auctions and radio spectrum reallocation (2014)Deferred-acceptance auctions …Selling privacy at auction (2013)Selling privacy at auctionLearning on a budget (2012)Learning on a budgetBudget Feasible Mechanism Design: From Prior-Free to Bayesian (2012)Budget Feasible Mechanism Des…Budget feasible mechanism design (2012)Budget feasible mechanism des…On the Approximability of Budget Feasible Mechanisms (2011)On the Approximability of Bud…On the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms (2011)On the approximability of bud…Mechanisms for complement-free procurement (2011)Mechanisms for complement-fre…Multipart pricing of public goods (1971)Incentives in Teams (1973)Truth Revelation in Rapid, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions (1999)Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions (2004)CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions (2005)On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting (2005)Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy (2007)Hide and Seek: Costly Consumer Privacy in a Market with Repeat Purchases (2012)Data Trading With Multiple Owners, Collectors, and Users: An Iterative Auction Mechanism (2017)Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design (2018)Digital Privacy (2022)The value of knowing a demand curve: bounds on regret for online posted-price auctions (2004)Dynamic Pricing Without Knowing the Demand Function: Risk Bounds and Near-Optimal Algorithms (2009)Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing (2010)Incentivizing exploration (2014)Adaptive Contract Design for Crowdsourcing Markets: Bandit Algorithms for Repeated Principal-Agent Problems (2016)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions (2002)A survey on networking games in telecommunications (2004)Worst-case equilibria (2009)Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence (1986)Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004)Breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders (2016)Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof (2018)Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities (2005)A co-utility approach to the mesh economy: the crowd-based business model (2016)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS7,719 cited
  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 2001Algorithmic Mechanism Design1,331 cited
  • 2008Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions320 cited

Cited by

  • 2013Selling privacy at auction156 cited
  • 2012Learning on a budget113 cited
  • 2011On the approximability of budget feasible mechanisms94 cited
  • 2014Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An Optimal 1-1/e Competitive Budget-Feasible Mechanism for Large Markets83 cited
  • 2011On the Approximability of Budget Feasible Mechanisms77 cited
  • 2014Deferred-acceptance auctions and radio spectrum reallocation76 cited
  • 2011Mechanisms for complement-free procurement61 cited
  • 2012Budget Feasible Mechanism Design: From Prior-Free to Bayesian59 cited
  • 2022Data pricing in machine learning pipelines57 cited
  • 2012Budget feasible mechanism design44 cited
  • 2015A Truthful Budget Feasible Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Time Critical Tasks42 cited
  • 2021

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A two-stage incentive mechanism for rebalancing free-floating bike sharing systems: Considering user preference
39 cited
  • 2020Spatial-Temporal Inventory Rebalancing for Bike Sharing Systems With Worker Recruitment24 cited