The Discreet Charm of Formal Institutions

Abstract

Why do some new democratic political politicians constrain themselves and reduce their discretion to extract resources from the state and the processes of privatization? Postcommunist democracies show surprising variation in the adoption of formal institutions of monitoring and oversight. These institutions regulate markets, empower citizen oversight, and police the use and distribution of state assets. These have arisen rapidly in some countries and with considerable delays in others. Accounts that link institutional creation to European Union imposition, initial bargaining, and parliamentary divisions do not fully explain the variation. Instead, in the nine consolidated democracies and free markets examined here, robust political competition triggered mechanisms of anticipatory institution building and moderation of government behavior.

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