Export Credit Guarantees, Moral Hazard and Exports Quality

Maria del Carmen Garcia-Alonso · Paul L. Levine · Antonia Morga

16 citations0/0 files storedBulletin of Economic Research

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Global trade and economics International Business and FDI Law, logistics, and international trade

Abstract

Abstract We analyse the role played by export credit guarantees (ECGs) in encouraging exports to developing countries. The existence of moral hazard on the side of the firm is introduced. We show that the inability of the exporter's government to verify the actual quality of the product will limit its ability to encourage trade through ECGs, once the coverage provided goes beyond a certain threshold. This result provides a rationale behind the limited coverage on ECGs.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 16 citations exist upstream.

References

1983A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence 2002The Theory of Incentives 1986A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt 2001Incentives and Political Economy 2003Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information 1995Regulation, moral hazard and insurance of environmental risks 1998Warranties, extended warranties, and product quality 2002The Economic Institution of International Barter

Cited by

2016An analysis of government loan guarantees and direct investment through public-private partnerships

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.