SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Incentives to managers or participation of farmers in China's irrigation systems: which matters most for water savings, farmer income, and poverty?
5 references·1 citing·22 second hop
Incentives to managers or participation of farmers in China's irrigation systems: which matters most for water savings, farmer income, and poverty? (2006)Incentives to managers or participation o…What Affects Organization and Collective Action for Managing Resources? Evidence from Canal Irrigation Systems in India (2002)What Affects Organization and…Transfer of Irrigation Management Services: Guidelines (2001)Transfer of Irrigation Manage…Accelerating China's rural transformation (1999)Accelerating China's rural tr…Institutions and collective action : self-governance in irrigation (1992)Institutions and collective a…Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems (1992)Crafting Institutions for Sel…Water-saving service supply chain cooperation under social welfare maximization (2019)Water-saving service supply c…Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (1992)Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy. (1995)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Migration and household investment in rural China (2006)Reconciling the Returns to Education in Off‐Farm Wage Employment in Rural China (2007)Debating China's Economic Growth: The Beijing Consensus or The Washington Consensus (2010)Governing the commons — the evolution of institutions for collective action (1992)THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: APPLICATIONS FOR AGRICULTURAL POLICY RESEARCH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2002)Constraints on Collective Action in a Transitional Economy: The Case of Bulgaria’s Irrigation Sector (2003)When and how far is group formation a route out of chronic poverty? (2005)The Bargaining Problem (1950)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Intermediate microeconomics : A modern approach (2006)Deal or no deal on water‐saving program? Exploring the optimal interval for government subsidies and internal incentives (2020)Water Saving Management Contract, identification and ranking of risks based on life cycle and best-worst method (2021)Institutionalised Co-production: Unorthodox Public Service Delivery in Challenging Environments (2004)Beyond panaceas in water institutions (2007)The Meaning of Social Capital and its Link to Collective Action (2009)Social capital: a fad or a fundamental concept?* (2005)Collective action and the evolution of social norms (2014)Application of the Analytic Hierarchy Process to irrigation project improvement (2007)Water User Associations and the Politics of Water in Jordan (2015)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1992Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems1,073 cited
  • 1992Institutions and collective action : self-governance in irrigation424 cited
  • 2002What Affects Organization and Collective Action for Managing Resources? Evidence from Canal Irrigation Systems in India368 cited
  • 1999Accelerating China's rural transformation171 cited
  • 2001Transfer of Irrigation Management Services: Guidelines73 cited

Cited by

  • 2019Water-saving service supply chain cooperation under social welfare maximization13 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work