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Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets-in Search of Advice for Participants
10 references·16 citing·37 second hop
Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets-in Search of Advice for Participants (1999)Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets…Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists (1997)Turnaround Time and Bottlenec…Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions (1994)Jumping the Gun: Imperfection…Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory (1991)Comments on the Interpretatio…A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom. (1991)A natural experiment in the o…Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching (1990)Random Paths to Stability in …Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem (1985)Ms. Machiavelli and the Stabl…The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory (1984)The Evolution of the Labor Ma…Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets (1970)Stable marriage assignment fo…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic DesignThe Redesign of the Matching …Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey (2020)Experiments on centralized sc…Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets (2016)Incentive Compatibility of La…Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: An experimental investigation (2016)Boston versus deferred accept…Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism (2014)Two axiomatic approaches to t…Preference for Randomization: Empirical and Experimental Evidence (2013)Preference for Randomization:…Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets* (2013)Matching with Couples: Stabil…Flipping a Coin: Theory and Evidence (2012)Flipping a Coin: Theory and E…School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation (2011)School Admissions Reform in C…Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness, and Incentives in Large Markets (2011)Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness,…On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems (2011)On two kinds of manipulation …Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match (2009)Strategy-proofness versus Eff…Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets (2008)Truncation Strategies in Matc…School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms (2008)School choice and information…Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets (2006)Incomplete information and si…Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments (2003)Ordinal efficiency and domina…The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design (1999)The Redesign of the Matching …Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes (1982)Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. (1992)Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism (2005)Constrained school choice (2009)The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives (1982)Chapter 16 Two-sided matching (1992)Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Markets (2011)The stable marriage problem (1971)Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts (2010)The College Admissions problem with lower and common quotas (2010)Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm (1981)Some remarks on the stable matching problem (1985)Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model (1986)Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications (2001)Matching Markets: Theory and Practice (2013)Two-Person Cooperative Games (1953)Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations (1977)Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (1982)On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall (1997)Analogy-based expectation equilibrium (2004)Evolution of the Social Contract (2014)Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria (1998)Unraveling Reduces Mobility in a Labor Market: Gastroenterology with and without a Centralized Match (2003)Marketplaces, Markets, and Market Design (2018)College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action (1986)Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term (1995)Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1991)Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. (1991)The Social Sources of Educational Credentialism: Status Cultures, Labor Markets, and Organizations (2001)The Power of Market Intermediaries: From Information to Valuation Processes (2013)A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks (1996)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Contrasting Computational Models of Mate Preference Integration Across 45 Countries (2019)Pairwise kidney exchange (2005)The New York City High School Match (2005)Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets (2007)
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References

  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage5,978 cited
  • 1984The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory1,217 cited
  • n.d.The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design757 cited
  • 1991Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory521 cited
  • 1990Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching355 cited
  • 1991A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom.342 cited
  • 1994Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions342 cited
  • 1970Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets226 cited
  • 1997Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists205 cited
  • 1985Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem202 cited

Cited by

  • 2008School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms173 cited
  • 2013Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets*166 cited
  • 1999The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design140 cited
  • 2016Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets

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104 cited
  • 2011School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation95 cited
  • 2014Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism93 cited
  • 2020Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey83 cited
  • 2016Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: An experimental investigation78 cited
  • 2008Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets76 cited
  • 2011Ordinal Efficiency, Fairness, and Incentives in Large Markets76 cited
  • 2011On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems74 cited
  • 2003Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments72 cited
  • 2006Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets72 cited
  • 2009Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match68 cited
  • 2012Flipping a Coin: Theory and Evidence7 cited
  • 2013Preference for Randomization: Empirical and Experimental Evidence5 cited