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Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal–Supervisor–Agent Relationship
9 references·4 citing·39 second hop
Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal–Supervisor–Agent Relationship (1997)Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principa…Collusion and the theory of organizations (2008)Collusion and the theory of o…On the optimality of allowing collusion (1996)On the optimality of allowing…Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion (1995)Revolving Doors and the Optim…Collusion in Hierarchical Agency (1993)Collusion in Hierarchical Age…Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing (1993)Coalitions, Incentives, and R…The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture (1991)The Politics of Government De…Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three-Level Hierarchy (1990)Analysis of Hidden Gaming in …Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement (1990)Adverse Selection and Renegot…Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations (1986)Hierarchies and Bureaucracies…Do Agents Game Their Agents’ Behavior? Evidence from Sales Managers (2015)Do Agents Game Their Agents’ …Corruption in procurement and public purchase (2006)Corruption in procurement and…A STUDY ON AUDIT SYSTEM OF PROJECT EVALUATION (2004)A STUDY ON AUDIT SYSTEM OF PR…How corruption in government affects public welfare: A review of theory (2001)How corruption in government …Optimal Auction Design (1981)Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay (2015)‘Sweet deals’: State-owned enterprises, corruption and repeated contracts in public procurement (2017)Improving Public Procurement Outcomes : Review of Tools and the State of the Evidence Base (2021)Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium (1960)Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality (1986)Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria (1987)Behind the Revolving Door: A New View of Public Utility Regulation (1995)The revolving door and the SEC’s enforcement outcomes: Initial evidence from civil litigation (2015)The Revolving Door for Financial Regulators (2016)Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers (1974)A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality) (1996)Corruption and Rent-Seeking (2002)Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law (2002)The institutional economics of corruption and reform: theory, evidence, and policy (2007)A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence (1983)Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of the Literature (2001)Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in transition economies (2003)The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government (2004)The economic institutions of capitalism firms, markets, relational contracting (1985)The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1987)Corruption and Growth (1995)Aid Allocation by German NGOs: Does the Degree of Public Refinancing Matter? (2010)Structural convergence of European countries (2010)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)The Social Psychology of Organizations. (1979)An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. (1983)The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems (1999)The Handbook of Organizational Economics (2013)Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated? (1995)International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption (2006)Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data (2009)Corruption, extortion and evasion (1999)Incentives and Political Economy (2001)Collusion Under Asymmetric Information (1997)Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information (2003)Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing (1991)Optimal Retention in Agency Problems (1998)Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1986Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations1,227 cited
  • 1991The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture1,155 cited
  • 1993Collusion in Hierarchical Agency407 cited
  • 2008Collusion and the theory of organizations372 cited
  • 1990Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement323 cited
  • 1993Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing232 cited
  • 1995Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion196 cited
  • 1996On the optimality of allowing collusion145 cited
  • 1990Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three-Level Hierarchy112 cited

Cited by

  • 2006Corruption in procurement and public purchase145 cited
  • 2001How corruption in government affects public welfare: A review of theory114 cited
  • 2015Do Agents Game Their Agents’ Behavior? Evidence from Sales Managers19 cited
  • 2004A STUDY ON AUDIT SYSTEM OF PROJECT EVALUATION4 cited

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