Parsimony and the Argument from Queerness

Abstract

In his recent book Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence, Jonas Olson attempts to revive the argument from queerness originally made famous by J.L. Mackie.In this paper, we do three things.First, we eliminate four untenable formulations of the argument.Second, we argue that the most plausible formulation is one that depends crucially upon considerations of parsimony.Finally, we evaluate this formulation of the argument.We conclude that it is unproblematic for proponents of moral nonnaturalism-the target of the argument from queerness.tools of formal epistemology now commonplace in the philosophy of science.We argue that, once Olson's queerness argument is subjected to close scrutiny, it becomes clear that proponents of moral non-naturalism-the target of the argument from queerness-have nothing to fear. Queerness and Irreducible NormativityOlson distinguishes four plausible interpretations of Mackie's argument from queerness.These interpretations focus on four different features of the moral domain: supervenience, knowledge, motivation, and irreducible normativity.Olson argues that queerness arguments focusing on the first three features of the moral domain fail.The argument focusing on supervenience depends upon Hume's Dictum, the claim that there can be no relations of necessary coextension between distinct properties.But Hume's Dictum, Olson argues, is a controversial metaphysical principle that has implications far beyond the moral and the normative domains.So, this queerness argument is held hostage to a more general issue in metaphysics-the debate over whether Hume's Dictum is true.Until that debate is resolved, the force of the first queerness argument is entirely unclear.According to the argument focusing on knowledge, it is inexplicable how humans could have epistemic access to moral facts 1 given that these facts are, by non-naturalists' own admission, sui generis.Humans must have some very odd faculty that allows them to know about these facts.What on earth could that faculty be?Olson rejects this argument because, even if it were successful, it would not establish that the error theory is true. 2 At best, it would vindicate moral skepticism-the view that we cannot know anything about moral reality. 1 For ease of exposition, we shall use "moral facts" to refer to moral facts, properties, relations, and values.2 By "the error theory", we shall mean the view according to which moral judgments are beliefs that ascribe moral properties, even though such properties do not exist or are never instantiated.Thus, the error theory has two components: a linguistic component (i.e., moral judgments are beliefs that ascribe moral properties) and an ontological component (i.e., moral properties don't exist or are never instantiated).In this paper, we shall focus exclusively on the ontological component of the error theory.

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