Voter Turnout in Presidential Democracies

Abstract

Numerous studies indicate that political institutions play an important role in explaining variation in voter turnout across countries. The nuances of institutions unique to presidential elections have been largely overlooked, however, despite the different incentives they offer for voters to participate in elections. This article examines the effect that four presidential institutions had on voter turnout in presidential elections between 1974 and 2004—the timing of elections (whether concurrent or nonconcurrent), the power of the presidency, presidential electoral rules (plurality or majority runoff), and reelection rules. To isolate the effect of presidential institutions, this study controls for other likely influences on turnout, including the economic environment and the wider political context. It finds that (a) runoff elections dampen turnout whereas incumbency spurs it and (b) more powerful presidencies and elections, when held concurrently with legislative elections, have little effect on voter participation.

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