The Determinants of Judiciary Independence: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional Court (1956–2002)

Nadia Fiorino · Fabio Padovano · Grazia Sgarra

23 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Judicial and Constitutional Studies Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems Law and Political Science

Abstract

This paper tests the explanatory power of alternative theories on the determinants of judiciary independence using annual and decision-based data on the Italian Constitutional Court. The estimates show that structural measures of judiciary independence, such as the share of constitutional judges elected by the ranks of the professional judiciary and the age of justices, are positively correlated with independent behavior of the Court. Contrary to previous studies on a similar sample, we find that the Court counteracts the greater cohesion of the other government branches with more independent behavior, improving the effectiveness of the system of checks and balances.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 23 citations exist upstream.

References

1987Co-Integration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation, and Testing 1987Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control 1991Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries 1984The Selection of Disputes for Litigation 1997Separation of Powers and Political Accountability 2003Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators 1994The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach 2000Veto Players and Institutional Analysis

Cited by

2009The time-varying independence of Italian peak judicial institutions 2017Careerism and judicial behavior 2016Compromesso astorico: the role of the Senate after the Italian constitutional reform

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.