Properties, Powers, and the Subset Account of Realization

Abstract

According to thesubset account of realization, a property,F, is realized by another property,G, wheneverFis individuated by a non‐empty proper subset of the causal powers by whichGis individuated (andFis not a conjunctive property of whichGis a conjunct). This account is especially attractive because it seems both to explain the way in which realized properties are nothing over and above their realizers, and to provide for the causal efficacy of realized properties. It therefore seems to provide a way around the causal exclusion problem. There is reason to doubt, however, that the subset account can achieve both tasks. The problem arises when we look closely at the relation between properties and causal powers, specifically, at the idea that propertiesconferpowers on the things that have them. If realizers are to be ontically prior to what they realize, then we must regard theconferralof powers by properties as a substantive relation of determination. This relation of conferral is at the heart of a kind of exclusion problem, analogous to the familiar causal exclusion problem. I argue that the subset account cannot adequately answer this new exclusion problem, and is for that reason ill‐suited to be the backbone of a non‐reductive physicalism.

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