Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation: Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories

Hua Wang · Nlandu Mamingi · Susmita Dasgupta

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Regulation and Compliance Studies Energy, Environment, Economic Growth Political Influence and Corporate Strategies

Abstract

In dealing with local environmental authorities, Chinese firms facing adverse financial situations have more bargaining power than other firms, while those generating more complaints from the public about their emissions have less

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1974Theories of Economic Regulation 1974Theories of Economic Regulation 1995Efficient estimation of models for dynamic panel data 1996Informal Regulation of Industrial Pollution in Developing Countries: Evidence from Indonesia 1996Compliance and Enforcement: Air Pollution Regulation in the U.S. Steel Industry 1999Monitoring and enforcement of environmental policy 1989Regulation and Markets 2001Inspections, pollution prices, and environmental performance: evidence from China

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2017Are foreign investors attracted to weak environmental regulations? Evaluating the evidence from China

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