References

• 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
• 1973The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities29,064 cited
• 1983Separation of Ownership and Control19,446 cited
• 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
• 1985The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences6,243 cited
• 1991Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design6,042 cited
• 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
• 1992The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies3,591 cited
• 1985The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies3,270 cited
• 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
• 1983An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem2,127 cited
• 1992An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem1,913 cited
• 1997Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm1,518 cited
• 1999The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels1,457 cited
• 1999The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: an analysis of the magnitude and determinants1,391 cited