Moore's Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief and Conscious Belief

Abstract

Abstract In this journal, Hamid Vahid argues against three families of explanation of Moore‐paradoxicality. The first is theWittgensteinian approach; I assert thatpjust in case I assert that I believe thatp.So making a Moore‐paradoxical assertion involves contradictory assertions. The second is theepistemic approach, one committed to: if I am justified in believing thatpthen I am justified in believing that I believe thatp. So it is impossible to have a justified omissive Moore‐paradoxical belief. The third is theconscious belief approach, being committed to: if I consciously believe thatpthen I believe that I believe thatp. So if I have a conscious omissive Moore‐paradoxical belief, then I have contradictory second‐order beliefs. In their place, Vahid argues for thedefective‐interpretation approach, broadly that charity requires us to discount the utterer of a Moore‐paradoxical sentence as a speaker. I agree that the Wittgensteinian approach is unsatisfactory. But so is the defective‐interpretation approach. However, there is a satisfactory version of each of the epistemic and conscious‐belief approaches.

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