Two kinds of theory-laden cognitive processes: Distinguishing intransigence from dogmatism

Elias L. Khalil

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Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Cognitive Science and Education Research

Abstract

The brain is involved in theory-laden cognitive processes. But there are two different theory-laden processes. In cases where the theory is based on facts, more facts can either falsify or confirm a theory. In cases where the theory is about the choice of a benchmark or a standard, more facts can only make a theory either more or less warranted.

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References

1987The Intentional Stance 1984Stories, Scripts, and Scenes: Aspects of Schema Theory 2011On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme 2012Understanding all inconsistency compensation as a palliative response to violated expectations 2007Neuroconstructivism - IHow the brain constructs cognition 2012Neuroanthropology or simply anthropology? Going experimental as method, as object of study, and as research aesthetic 2010The Bayesian fallacy: Distinguishing internal motivations and religious beliefs from other beliefs

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