Family Involvement and Post-IPO Investment Policy

Abstract

Drawing from agency theory and socioemotional wealth considerations, we evaluate the extent post-IPO investment policy choices and their economic consequences differ for family firms relative to nonfamily firms. Our results suggest that family firms underinvest in post-IPO liquidity, total investment spending, and R&D expenditures, relative to similar non-family firms. On the other hand, family firms overinvest in capital spending and underinvest in acquisition spending relative to nonfamily firms with dispersed but not concentrated ownership structures. Furthermore, while increases in R&D spending decrease shareholder value in family firms, the reverse is the case with acquisition spending.

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