Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provisionJames Andreoni A, Laura Gee2012-08-29articleJournal of Public Economics189 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesLaw, Economics, and Judicial SystemsEconomic Policies and ImpactsAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 189 citations exist upstream.References2007z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments2002Altruistic punishment in humans2000Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments1992Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible2008Antisocial Punishment Across Societies2007Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study1986The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good.2006The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning InstitutionsCited by2013Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes2019Punishment: one tool, many uses2013Individual heterogeneity and costly punishment: a volunteer's dilemma2019The choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems: a survey of experimental research2013The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract2016Building the Leviathan – Voluntary centralisation of punishment power sustains cooperation in humans2015Punitive preferences, monetary incentives and tacit coordination in the punishment of defectors promote cooperation in humans2012Legitimate punishment, feedback, and the enforcement of cooperation