Pressure and Politics in Financial Accounting Regulation: The Case of the Financial Conglomerates in the Netherlands

Abstract

This article examines the political process of promulgating two controversial laws which pertain to the reporting of Dutch financial conglomerates. Central to the study is the exploration of the lobbying efforts observed during the process, and the interaction between the government, the supervisors of banks and insurance companies, the industry and its associations, and the users and auditors of annual reports of financial conglomerates. Previous studies in accounting‐rule development have often ignored influences that do not fall within the formal regulatory procedures. By adopting an inductive research approach, this study explores in some detail the behaviour of participants, including their use of informal lobbying methods. Pluralist theory is used to explain the nature of the political process and the behaviour of interested parties. The findings indicate that the Dutch political process in accounting matters is indeed pluralistic. Although auditors and producers of accounts seem to have greater possibilities to participate, the users of corporate reports are able to voice their opinion effectively. Overall, the users' preferences were acknowledged in the final rules governing the reporting by financial conglomerates.

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