On the rationality of emotions: or, When are emotions rational?

Abstract

The connections between emotion and rationality are reexamined. Historically, Plato’s doctrine of the tripartite soul has established the preconception of a strict separation of emotion/passion from cognition/rationality, encouraging the biased perception that emotions are inherently irrational. To examine whether emotions can be rational, one must first examine the various meanings of rationality as developed in philosophy, psychology and the social and economic sciences. In this article, three forms of rationality are distinguished, and it is suggested that they can act as criteria to judge the rationality of emotions. Furthermore, before examining the possible relationships between emotion and rationality, the concept of emotion needs a more precise definition. A convergent definition of emotion is proposed in the form of a componential model that is based on an appraisal mechanism that produces tendencies for action to deal rapidly with important and urgent events in an individual’s life. It is demonstrated that emotions can be more or less correct or appropriate depending on the accuracy or realism of the underlying appraisal, the appropriateness of the response pattern and the efficacy of the emotion regulation. Considered in the framework of this componential model, it is suggested that emotions can be assessed as to whether, in a particular situation, they are adaptive (functional), based on well-grounded, accurate inference from available information and considered as reasonable reactions by others. Emotions can be considered rational when they fulfill at least one of these three criteria of rationality.

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